3D Security Initiative

As part of the “Security for a New Century” Senate briefings hosted through a joint partnership between Senator Lugar and the Stimson Center, the topic of Thursday December 7th’s session was, in short, whether or not US Foreign Aid was effective in bolstering America’s image broad and if not, how can it be reinvigorated or reconfigured to maximize both aid efficiency and effectiveness and ensure maximum diplomatic potential abroad.

Terror Free Tomorrow’s Ken Ballen kicked off the discussion by explicating his organization’s mission, i.e. to focus on the drivers behind extremism and determine appropriate responses. According to Ballen, Terror Free Tomorrow (TFT) has conducted over 20 polls in the Muslim world and what TFT finds is that public opinion in favor of America is correlationally higher when US aid is accessible by the publics. For example, when the US Navy’s hospital ship Mercy toured South Asia and Southeast Asia providing pro bono medical assistance, aid and surgeries, positive public opinion toward America was high. In Indonesia, after Mercy left the archipelago’s shores, 85% of Indonesians polled were in favor of the Mercy mission and, more generally, US aid. In Bangladesh, post-Mercy, 90% of Bangladeshis polled were in favor of the mission and US aid.

Ballen cited several other examples where direct US foreign aid resulted in increased positive perspectives toward America: 1) when US foreign aid immediately responded to the earthquake crisis in Pakistan’s Kashmir region; not surprisingly, Pakistani opinion in favor of the US rose substantially; and 2) when US provided immediate aid to Tsunami victims in Indonesia. In both cases, local public opinion dramatically increased upon arrival of US aid.

TFT finds that the developing world wants direct foreign aid, as in the case of the US Mercy mission, the earthquake crisis, or the Tsunami. What the developing world finds less productive is when the US elects to direct foreign aid primarily through government institutions, as in the cases of Egypt or Pakistan (where US aid frequently goes to President Mubarak or President Musharraf, respectively, under the rubric of fighting terrorism), because many publics, at least those polled, find disfavor in government institutional routes because of alleged corruption and illegitimacy. In many cases, the people on the ground fail to ever see US funds. The publics within the developing world want aid channeled directly to people on the ground working within non-governmental organizations, civil society, religious organizations, etc.

Ballen concluded his presentation with a quote from the new President of Liberia, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, who said recently: “The West knows what they want for the developing world but they too infrequently ask the developing world what they want.” And according to the TFT polling, the developing world wants the aid directly, not through government structures.

Delving more into the “Washington” end of the foreign aid conversation (contrasting Ballen’s primary focus on the polled “field” and the developing world’s public opinion), Lael Brainard from Brookings Institution offered a succinct and incisive analysis of what’s structurally maligned in Washington vis-à-vis foreign aid. According to Brainard, Washington creates a new institution every time a new problem is tackled, compounding an ever growing problem within Washington: over fifty offices involved in foreign aid with over fifty strategic objectives.

Moreover, to add to the malignancy, once Washington decides to supply aid to a country it seems to be selecting countries that contradict Washington’s standards for democracy and good governance. Apparently, the countries receiving the highest per capita spending (in US aid) are also the countries that are the most poorly governed. There’s a correlation, according to Brainard. For example, US aid to Egypt is $30/person while US aid to Ghana is $4/person—despite the fact that Ghana is two times better governed according to Washington standards. This is a problem.

Constantly reiterating that Congress needs to be engaged meaningfully in oversight of foreign aid assistance reform, Brainard outlined principles for reform that included the following:

1) Align Budget, Policy and Operations (translation: Washington needs better communication and coordination among all existing agencies, of which there are many)
2) Rationalize Agencies and Clarify Missions (translation: Washington can’t create a new agency every time there’s a new problem, Washington must consolidate its 50 different agencies with their 50 different strategic objectives)
3) Support Country Ownership (translation: Washington’s foreign aid is most effective when it’s according to the principles and objectives of the people on the ground)
4) Practice Transparency (translation: US foreign aid has been deemed to be the least effective in the world because the US generally slips it into the pockets of dictator regimes like President Mubarak in Egypt or President Musharraf in Pakistan)
5) Elevate the Development Mission (translation: Bush, like he mentioned in his 2002 national security strategy, needs to place development on the same level (i.e. on par) with Defense and Diplomacy)

Brainard drove the last point home with particular vehemence, stating that development should be at the table for all major decisions—much like the cabinet-level position development holds in the U.K. where it has a voice in all decision-making processes. In the US however, development is rarely invited. USAID, for example, is not at the table when Bush meets to talk about the Middle East, despite the fact that USAID has been intimately involved in stabilizing the Middle East.

By bringing development to the table, Washington can ensure inter-agency communication, between development, defense, and diplomacy. Presently, while all 3 Ds (development, defense, and diplomacy) have stock in conflict zones like the Middle East, these 3 Ds are not working together and communicating together, nor are all 3 Ds getting priority emphasis from Washington.

As a result, Washington bolsters only one of the 3 Ds mentioned by President Bush in his 2002 national security strategy, defense, while leaving the State Department’s highly relevant office of reconstruction and stabilization (a combination of development and diplomacy) out to dry. This must change, according to Brainard, if Washington desires a more effective foreign aid strategy.

However, none of this reform or change is possible, says Brainard, unless Congress gets involved. Congress is the key, which explains Brainard’s appearance on the Hill as part of a long-running “Security for a New Century” Senate briefing series. An appropriate summons, therefore, for 3D Security types reading this blog to ring up their Members of Congress and request better coordination, better communication and better balancing between all 3 Ds. It’s time for development and diplomacy to be at the table, always.

The panel was moderated by Geneve Mantri and featured Dr. Lael Brainard, Vice President of the Brookings Institution and Director of the Global Economy and Development Program and Ken Ballen, the President of Terror Free Tomorrow

- Submitted by Michael Shank